Building a productive workforce: the role of structured management practices by Cornwell, Christopher et al.
Building a productive workforce: the role of structured management 
practices
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103404/
Version: Published Version
Monograph:
Cornwell, Christopher, Schmutte, Ian M. and Scur, Daniela (2019) Building a 
productive workforce: the role of structured management practices. CEP 
Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, London, UK. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1644 
August 2019 
Building a Productive Workforce: The Role of Structured 
Management Practices 
 
Christopher Cornwell 
Ian M. Schmutte 
Daniela Scur 
 
 
    
Abstract 
Firms’ hiring and firing decisions affect the entire labor market. Managers often make these decisions, 
yet the effects of management on labor allocation remains largely unexplored. To study the 
relationship between a firm’s management practices and how it recruits, retains and dismisses its 
employees, we link a survey of firm-level management practices to production and employee records 
from Brazil. We find that firms using structured management practices consistently hire and retain 
better workers, and fire more selectively. Good production workers match with firms using structured 
personnel management practices. By contrast, better managers match with firms using structured 
operations management practices. 
 
 
 
Key words: labor allocation, managers, management practices, productivity 
JEL Codes: D22; M11; J31 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Growth Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
We use the Brazilian employer-employee dataset (RAIS) data under an agreement with the Ministério 
do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE), Brazil’s labor ministry, which collects and maintains RAIS. We thank 
Carlos Lessa at the Brazilian statistics agency (IBGE) for access to the Brazilian industrial survey data 
(PIA). We thank Erik Brynjolfsson, Bob Gibbons, Hilary Hoynes, Lisa Kahn, Raffaella Sadun and 
Kathryn Shaw for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants at the LERA Session 
at ASSA 2017, the Empirical Management Conference 2018, RES 2019, SOLE 2019, ESCoE 
productivity workshop, NBER Org meeting (fall 2018), SIOE 2019 and EPED 2019 for useful 
discussions and comments.  
 Christopher Cornwell, University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. Ian M. Schmutte, 
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business. Daniela Scur, Cornell University and Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 
 
 
 C. Cornwell, I.M. Schmutte and D. Scur, submitted 2019. 
1 Introduction
Firms’ decisions about whom to hire and fire affect not only their own bottom line, but the func-
tioning of the entire labor market. Recent work in labor economics documents the importance
of worker-firm matching for productivity (Iranzo et al. 2008; Abowd et al. 2017; Bender et al.
2018), inequality (Card et al. 2013; Alvarez et al. 2018; Song et al. 2019), and wage differentials
(Card et al. 2016; Lavetti and Schmutte 2018; Sorkin 2018). But what are the actual processes
that generate the observed assignment of workers to firms? Oyer and Schaefer (2011) suggest
that to understand labor market matching, economists should focus on the active role played a
firm’s managers and management practices. However, most studies of the labor market abstract
away from how real-world differences in managerial competence affect job matching.1 The em-
pirical relevance of differences in management practices for the allocation of labor remains largely
unexplored.
In this paper, we provide a first look into the relationship between a firm’s management prac-
tices, the quality of the managers that implement those practices, and the processes by which it
recruits, retains and dismisses production workers. We have assembled a detailed dataset that
links firm-level survey measures of management practices from the World Management Survey
(WMS) to matched employer-employee data from Brazil, the Relação Anual de Informações So-
ciais (RAIS). Based on the WMS data, we characterize each firm as having either structured or
unstructured management practices, with respect to both its management of people and its man-
agement of production operations. By “structured” we mean that the firm has formal management
systems in place that are independent of the manager implementing them. Using the RAIS data, we
construct measures of the quality of each establishment’s managerial and non-managerial work-
force. The longitudinal structure of RAIS also allows us to track how firms manage workforce
quality through their hiring, retention and firing decisions. Finally, we link our WMS-RAIS sam-
ple to data from Brazil’s industrial survey, the Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA), to verify that our
measures of worker quality and management do, in fact, correlate with productivity.
Our findings are as follows. First, firms with structured management practices hire dispro-
portionately from the top of the worker quality distribution, especially when recruiting managers.
Second, these firms are also more successful at keeping their high-quality hires. Their incumbent
managers are twice as likely to be high-quality and their advantage among incumbent production
workers is almost as large. Third, firms with structured management practices have much lower
overall rates of firing, suggesting they screen or motivate workers more effectively. Furthermore,
1The assortative matching model of Becker (1973) is the classic example, but in most contemporary discussions
of job matching in economics, like Card et al. (2018) or Sorkin (2018), matching happens without the intervention of
any particular or specialized managerial structures.
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when they do dismiss production workers, firms using structured practices fire more selectively
with respect to worker quality. Overall, the use of structured management practices is associated
with an increase in worker quality of around one half of a standard deviation for managers, and
one-third of a standard deviation for production workers. For both worker groups, around one quar-
ter of the relationship between management practices and worker quality remains after controlling
for observed worker and firm characteristics.
If these relationships reflect the direct influence of management practices, we expect them to
operate primarily through personnel management. Indeed, for production workers, the positive
relationship between management practices and worker quality is explained entirely by the per-
sonnel practices index. For managers, by contrast, both the personnel and operations practices
indices matter and in roughly equal measure. These results are consistent with a model in which
personnel management practices facilitate the recruiting and retention of better production work-
ers and structured operations practices attract better managers (or better managers are required to
implement structured practices in both domains. This is the first time these patterns have been
documented so clearly in the data.
We contribute to a growing empirical literature in organizational and labor economics studying
how management practices affect matching in the labor market. Advances in this area have been
made possible by efforts like ours to assemble data on key features of the employment relationship.
Focusing just on managers, Bandiera et al. (2015) show risk averse, low-talent managers prefer
low-powered incentives, as do firm owners that benefit from retaining control, while more talented
managers prefer high-powered incentives. This is consistent with high-quality managers being
attracted to firms with more structured management practices, as such firms should have greater
accountability and stronger incentives. A central managerial responsibility is the recruitment of
new workers, but Hoffman et al. (2018) show that there can be sizeable biases in managers’ hiring
decisions. They are concerned with the use of information technology to overcome bias, but our
work suggests that structured management practices may help discipline managers’ decisions about
whom to hire.
Our paper is most closely related to Bender et al. (2018), who combine WMS data with Ger-
man administrative records to study how worker quality mediates the positive relationship between
structured management practices and firm productivity. We find a very similar relationship be-
tween productivity and worker quality in Brazil, which is striking given differences between the
two economies and their workforces. While they report results separately for managers, they do so
by treating any worker in the top quartile of their firm’s pay distribution as a manager, because there
is no manager classification in the German data. In contrast, the RAIS data allow us to observe
managers directly via their occupation code, as well as isolate hires, fires and quits for both man-
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agerial and non-managerial workers. Thus, we are uniquely able to document how management
practices contribute to the selection and sorting of managers and production workers across firms.
Our results suggest many new avenues for empirical research, which we discuss in the conclusion.
2 Empirical Setting
We combine three datasets covering Brazilian firms: RAIS, which provides essential information
on workers and their jobs; the WMS, which contributes our measures of management practices,
and the Annual Industrial Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Anual - PIA), our source for firm input and
output data.
2.1 Worker quality, occupation, and employment history: RAIS
We first use the RAIS data to construct a measure of worker quality derived from the part of their
wage that follows them from job to job. More specifically, we associate worker quality with the
estimated worker effects from a decomposition of log wages into worker- and firm-specific com-
ponents, following the approach introduced by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) (henceforth
the AKM decomposition).2 For the wage decomposition, we use the 2003-2013 waves of RAIS to
build a sample of employees who are contracted to work at least 30 hours per week, have at least
one month of tenure and have complete data on time-varing covariates. We exclude workers in
establishments with only one employee, and observations beyond the top and bottom 0.01 percent
of the wage distribution. These restrictions leave us with 353,141,951 unique worker-firm-year
observations covering 96,499,697 unique workers and 4,433,492 unique establishments.3
The wage decomposition involves estimating a two-way fixed-effects model of the form:
ln yit = α + xitβ + ψJ(i,t) + θi + εit, (1)
where yit is the wage of worker i at time t.
4 Our primary interest is in the worker effects, θi, which
2As many studies have shown, the relationship between AKMworker effects and underlying ability or productivity
is unclear theoretically (Shimer 2005; Eeckhout and Kircher 2011; Abowd et al. 2018). However, as we document
in Section 3.1, they are strongly correlated with firm productivity. Hence, the “quality” label seems reasonable in the
sense that the estimated worker effects reflect a set of attributes that firms find desirable.
3Appendix A provides details of the sample construction and summary statistics on the workers that comprise it.
4For the wage variable we take average monthly earnings, reported in 2003 Brazilian Reais, and convert it into an
hourly measure. The monthly earnings data can be thought of as measuring the contracted monthly wage, a common
institutional arrangement in Brazil. We convert this to an hourly measure by dividing the monthly wage by contracted
hours per week, and then by 4.17. When a worker is employed for 12 months, average monthly earnings is simply
annual earnings divided by 12. When a worker is employed fewer than 12 months, the total earnings paid for the year
are divided by the number of months worked; for partial months, the earnings are pro-rated to reflect what the worker
3
capture the value of portable skills and represent our measure of worker quality. The model xit
contains a normalized cubic in labor-market experience interacted with race and gender.5, 6 The
ψJ(i,t) are firm effects that reflect employer-specific wage premia paid by establishment j = J(i, t),
where J(i, t) indicates worker i’s job in year t and εit is a mean-zero error. Under strict exogeneity
of εit with respect to xit, θi and ψJ(i,t), least squares will produce unbiased estimates of the worker
and firm effects.7
Similar to other settings — for example, Germany (Card et al. 2013), Portugal (Card et al.
2016) and the US (Abowd et al. 2017) — we find the AKM model provides a comprehensive
description of the sources of wage variation, with an R2 above .90. Worker quality (θˆi) accounts
for just under half of the total variation in log wages. By contrast, the firm-specific component of
pay (ψˆj), explains 18.5 percent.
8
Our data allows us to separately measure the average quality of production workers and man-
agers within each establishment. In our RAIS-WMS sample, roughly 5 percent of the employees
hold managerial positions, which is consistent with the 4.88 percent share of managers reported
in the WMS. We refer to the remaining 95 percent of workers interchangeably as non-managers
or production workers.9 In the WMS firms, average quality is almost twenty times higher for
managers than production workers. However, average manager quality is more variable, with a
standard deviation of 0.389 compared with 0.305 for production workers.
In addition, RAIS provides detailed employment histories that allow us to track the quality
of worker flows into and out of the firm at both the managerial and non-managerial levels. In
particular, RAIS records the exact date of hire for each worker, as well as the date and reason for
separation when a job ends. Thus, we are able to evaluate a firm’s hiring, retention and dismissal
activity as a function of its management practices, for both managers and production workers.
would have earned for the entire month. All of these calculations are performed by the MTE and included in the raw
RAIS data.
5For workers whose first employment begins in 2003 or after, experience is the sum of all months they are reported
in at least one active employment relationship. For workers whose first employment started prior to 2003, we ap-
proximate experience as the greater of potential experience (age-years of schooling-6) or tenure in the first observed
job.
6Card et al. (2018) note that in a model with year effects, the experience profile is not identified relative to worker
effects without a normalization. We normalize the experience profile to be flat at 20 years of experience.
7However, as explained in Abowd et al. (1999), this assumption rules out endogenous mobility.
8Because the AKM decomposition is not our focus, we offer a discussion of only the essential results of estimation
here. For interested readers, the Appendix tables B.2 and B.3 report the variance decomposition of wages into the
components of the AKM model and the estimated correlations between them.
9Our classification of managers is in sharp contrast to Bender et al. (2018), whose German data do not distinguish
managerial and nonmanagerial workers. Consequently, they assume all workers in the top quartile of the within-firm
pay distribution are managers.
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2.2 Structured management practices: WMS
The WMS project employs double-blind surveys to collect data on firms’ management practices.
Focusing on firms with employment of 50–5,000 workers, WMS analysts interview the senior-
most manager at a plant and score their responses on a set of 18 basic management practices. The
scores range from 1 to 5 indicating the degree to which formal processes are in place.10 A higher
score implies that a firm has adopted a set of structured management practices, which have been
causally associated with improvements in productivity (Bloom et al. 2013; 2019).
In our analysis of hiring, retention and dismissal, we distinguish between firms that have struc-
tured management practices and those that do not. We average the reported management scores
across all 18 practices and define a firm as having “structured personnel management” if its av-
erage score is above 3. To choose this threshold, we focus on the explicit meaning of the survey
coding. A score of 3 or higher on any practice means that the firm has formal management pro-
cesses in place. A score below 3 implies that management processes are informal in the sense
that they would not be continued if the manager implementing them were to leave the firm.11 In
our regression analysis, we also employ continuous measures of management practices, following
the convention of using standardized averages.12 The average overall management score for the
Brazilian firms is 2.67, with a standard deviation of approximately 0.6, implying that the typical
establishment may have some structured practices in place, but they are idiosyncratic to a partic-
ular manager rather than part of a standard operating procedure. When compared with the overall
management score, Brazilian firms score lower (2.52) in personnel management and higher (2.78)
in operations management. Because we are focused on how firms build a productive workforce, we
also build a separate index of “personnel management” based on the six practices directly relating
to hiring, retention and dismissal decisions. We group the other 12 practices, which concern lean
operations, monitoring and target-setting, into a single “operations management” index, which we
define analogously.13
There are 763 unique firms in the Brazilian sample of the WMS: 227 surveyed in 2008 only,
10See Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Bloom et al. (2014) for more information on the WMS.
11For example, consider the personnel practice of “performance culture”. A score of 1 implies that “people within
the firm are rewarded equally irrespective of performance level” while 5 means that “firms strive to outperform the
competitors by providing ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related accountability and rewards” In
this case, the best score involves formal appraisal and evaluation of employees, with accountability and performance
processes to evaluate each worker’s contribution to the firm.
N.B.We have adopted the “structured” versus “unstructured” nomenclature to avoid confusing firms that use informal
management processes with firms operating in the informal sector, which is a large and important part of the Brazilian
economy.
12Specifically, we standardize each of the 18 questions, average across each index (overall management, operations
and people management) and standardize again. The results are robust to alternative index-building methods.
13Similarly to (Bloom et al. 2015) in their work on school management.
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228 surveyed in 2013 only, and 308 surveyed in 2008 and 2013. Of the 763 firms, 694 can be
matched to our RAIS sample for at least one year (213 in 2008, 214 in 2013 and 267 in both
years), yielding 961 total observations between 2008 and 2013.14
3 Results
We first show that our measures of management and worker quality are positively associated with
productivity. We then examine the relationship between structured management practices and the
quality of a firm’s hires, retentions and dismissals. Finally, we estimate the unconditional effect
of structured practices on worker quality, how much of this effect is mediated through observable
worker and firm characteristics and how much can be attributed to personnel versus operations
management. We carry out our analysis separately for managers and production workers, reveal-
ing important but intuitive differences in how structured management practices are used to build
workforce quality at the top and bottom of the organizational hierarchy.
3.1 More productive firms hire higher quality workers
To document the relationship between productivity and worker quality we link data on firm rev-
enue, employment and materials expenditure from the Brazilian annual industrial survey, Pesquisa
Industrial Anual (PIA) to our WMS-RAIS matched sample of firms.15 Using the combined data,
we estimate models predicting log sales as a function of capital, materials, as well as the overall
management practices score and the measured quality of managers and production workers. We
also control for industry sub-sector and family or founder ownership. Table I reports the results.
Columns (1) and (2) exclude the factor inputs. Higher overall management scores — that
is, structured management practices — strongly predict sales, and, conditional on management,
so does overall worker quality.16 Adding the factor inputs in Column (3) reduces the estimated
management-score and worker-quality coefficients by about one-half and two-thirds, respectively,
14Employees are matched to their employers through a code assigned by the Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica
(CNPJ), which also allows a match to the WMS and PIA. Of the 763 WMS firms, 745 have valid CNPJ identifiers.
The two sources match quite closely for the set of variables that are recorded in both, specifically the share of female
employees, the share of employees with a college degree, and weekly hours worked. Table B.1 provides the full
descriptive statistics for the matched RAIS-WMS firms.
15While the survey does not produce a direct measure of capital stock, one is estimated by the flagship Brazil-
ian economic research institute, Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Avancada (IPEA) and made available to eligible
researchers. We accessed PIA through an agreement with the Brazilian statistics agency, Instituto Brasileiro de Ge-
ografia e Estatistica (IBGE), in Rio de Janeiro.
16This is consistent with previous production function results using this measure (Bloom et al. 2019; 2016; Lemos
and Scur 2019)
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though both are still significant at the 1% level. These findings are remarkably consistent with
with results reported for Germany in Bender et al. (2018), despite the differences between the two
countries’ economies.
Columns (4)-(6) exploit the unique ability RAIS provides to cleanly distinguish managers from
non-managers.17 Column (4) indicates that worker quality at both levels matters for productivity,
but the variation loads to a much greater degree on managers: the manager quality coefficient es-
timate of .078 is more than twice that of production workers. Column (5) shows that the results
are robust to controlling for the share of workers with a college degree, an often-used proxy for
worker quality. Adding the AKM firm effect in Column (6) renders the relationship between aver-
age production worker quality and sales insignificant. However, the estimated management-score
and manager-quality coefficient remain highly significant, albeit with slightly smaller magnitudes.
These results are consistent with managers being primarily responsible for value generation. They
also suggest that higher wages may be one tool firms use to attract better production workers and
motivate them to work harder.
3.2 Firms with structured management hire the top and shed the bottom
Having established that worker quality — especially manager quality — is important for produc-
tivity, we turn to the hiring, retention and firing activity of the firms in our sample, distinguishing
those with structured management practices from those with unstructured practices.
3.2.1 Hiring
Figure 1 illustrates differences in the quality of hired managers (panel A) and production work-
ers (panel B) between firms with structured management practices and those without in the 2008
data.18 The horizontal axis shows the worker’s rank in the overall distribution of workers hired
in 2008. The vertial axis plots that worker’s rank in the distribution of workers hired into firms
with structured management (blue solid line) and unstructured management (green dashed line).
Intuitively, if all firms hire randomly with respect to worker quality, both curves would sit on the
45 degree line. This is clearly not the case. At every point in the distribution, the quality of workers
hired by firms with structured management is above that of firms with unstructured management.
To offer a concrete example, observe that the median manager working in a firm with unstruc-
tured management practices is in the 42nd percentile of the overall manager quality distribution. In
contrast, the median manager working in a firm with structured management practices was hired
17Disaggregating causes us to lose about 14 percent of the sample because of missing data on worker type.
18We use only data for 2008 in this graph, but the pattern is consistent across all other years.
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from the 59th percentile of the overall manager quality distribution. For production workers, the
median production worker hired into an unstructured management practices firm is in the 48th
percentile of the overall occupation’s distribution — effectively a random draw. The median pro-
duction worker in a firm with structured management, however, is drawn from the 56th percentile
of the overall distribution.
3.2.2 Retention
Hiring from the top will have less impact if high-quality hires are not retained. We classify job-year
observations that do not start or end in that year as a “retained” employee. Further, we rank workers
based on the distribution of estimated worker effects (θˆi) by year, and classify them as either “high-
quality” or “low-quality” if θˆi is above the 80th or below the 20th percentile, respectively. Figure 2
shows the ten-year pattern of the shares of employees in each rank of quality, as well as type
of firms (structured or unstructured management practices). Firms with structured management
practices consistently capture almost twice the share of managers and production workers from the
top of the distribution of worker quality.
The share of low quality production workers in firms with structured management increases
gradually after 2007, and this can be partly explained by the loss in overall employment share
by unstructured firms over time.19 Employees at the bottom of the quality distribution are more
likely to suffer a job separation, and some are being hired by growing firms that use structured
management practices.
3.2.3 Dismissals
The ability to fire is an important tool for managing the workforce. Our analysis suggests that
firms with structured management practices use it more judiciously. Unlike other linked employer-
employee datasets, RAIS includes the reason for separation, allowing us to distinguish jobs that
ended due to firing from those that ended because the worker quit.20 Figure 3 presents binned
scatter plots of firing rates for managers and production workers by worker quality, distinguishing
between firms with structured and unstructured practices.21
19From 2003 to 2013, the employment share of firms with unstructured management fell by about 7 percentage
points, effectively all of which was picked up by firms with structured management. Figure B.1 in the Appendix
depicts the pattern.
20Specifically, we define a separation as a firing if it was recorded as an “employer-initiated termination without just
cause.” We can also include as fires jobs reported to end due to “employer-initiated terminations with just cause,” but
these constitute an extremely small number of terminations.
21Specifically, we plot the residuals from regressions of a firing indicator and the worker effects (θˆis) on a set of
dummies for sex, race, year, and completed education. Each bin represents two percent of the observations and the
figure plots the bin-specific means.
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Two features of the data stand out. First, firms with structured management practices have
lower levels of firing rates throughout the worker-quality distribution. This could be evidence of
better matching earlier in the employee’s job cycle. Second, for a given firing rate, firms with
structured practices shed workers of lower quality than firms with unstructured practices, suggest-
ing that those without structured practices make more mistakes in firing. The patterns in the graphs
indicate that the mistakes may more pronounced in the upper part of the worker quality distribution.
3.3 Management practices and worker quality
The patterns depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3 provide new evidence that structured management
practices are important for building a stable, high-quality workforce. Now, we quantify how much
of the role of management is mediated through the observable worker and firm characteristics and
how much is attributable to structured personnel practices guiding hiring and retention decisions.
Using the sample of all workers employed by WMS between 2003-2013, we estimate a series of
regressions relating worker quality to management practices:
WorkerQualityij = α + βMGMTj +Xijγ1 + Zjγ2 + uij, (2)
whereWorkerQualityij is the θˆ z-score for worker i in firm j, standardized relative to its distribu-
tion across all workers in the analysis sample;MGMTj is a transformation of the employer’s man-
agement practices score; and Xij and Zj contain worker and firm characteristics, respectively.
22
We first estimate the unconditional effect of management practices on worker quality for dif-
ferent measures of the key variables. Then, using the overall index of management practices (z-
management) for MGMT , we incrementally introduce worker characteristics (age, number of
hours worked per week, gender, race and education level) and firm characteristics (multinational
status, the share of unionized workers, firm age, log of employment and industry effects). Finally,
we decompose the overall management practices index into the personnel and operations indices
(z-people and z-operations) described in 2.2. Table II presents the results. Consistent with the
figures, we carry out this exercise separately for managers (Panel A) and for production workers
(Panel B).
Analogously to Figure 2, Column (1) uses a top-quintile indicator for worker quality and
structured-practices indicator for MGMT . Firms with structured management are 15 percent-
age points more likely to have a manager from the top quintile of worker quality and 11 per-
centage points more likely to have a production worker from the top quintile. Switching to
22We index worker characteristics by i and j because all worker characteristics are reported by the employer and
are subject to change when workers change jobs (Cornwell et al. 2017).
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WorkerQuality as the dependent variable, Column (2) shows that managers in firms with struc-
tured management are almost half a standard deviation higher quality, while production workers
are of just under a third of a standard deviation higher quality. Column (3) replaces structured-
practices indicator with the overall management practices index (z-management). This specifi-
cation suggests that a standard deviation increase in the management index is associated with a
quarter (.250) of a standard deviation increase in manager quality and about one-fifth (.185) of
a standard deviation increase in production worker quality. Note that it would take a half stan-
dard deviation improvement in management practices to move the median firm into the structured
practices classification.
Columns (4) and (5) examine the degree to which the effect of management practices on qual-
ity is mediated through worker and firm characteristics. Worker characteristics explain about 60%
for both managers and production workers (Column (4)), reducing the estimated coefficients of z-
management to .107 and .084. This suggests that structured management practices produce higher
quality workforces in large part by hiring and retaining on the basis of observable predictors of
worker quality, such as education and experience. Adding firm characteristics further attenuates
the management index coefficient estimates – to .061 for managers and 0.051 for production work-
ers (Column (5)). Hence, part of the relationship between management and worker quality also
arises from high-quality workers sorting into firms with particular characteristics associated with
structured management, for instance, toward larger, multinational firms. While worker and firm
characteristics account for about three-quarters of the overall management effect on worker qual-
ity, a significant role for structured practices remains. Firms with high management scores given
their observed characteristics tend to employ workers of high quality given their observed charac-
teristics.
Ideally, we would like to to determine whether structured management practices actually en-
able firms to select higher quality workers more effectively. Unfortunately, this is not possible with
our data because we cannot rule out sorting on the basis of other unobserved worker or firm char-
acteristics. However, if structured practices do drive the selection of higher quality workers, the
process should operate primarily through personnel management. When we decompose the overall
management-practices index into the personnel and operations indices, we find that the variation
loads roughly evenly onto z-people and z-operations for managers, and entirely onto z-people for
production workers. For managers, the estimated coefficients of z-people and z-operations are
.030 and .037, both of which are significant at the 10% level. For production workers, on the
other hand, the estimated coefficient of z-people is .055, which is statistically significant, while
the z-operations coefficient estimate is essentially zero. These results are consistent with a model
in which structured personnel management practices drive the recruitment and retention of high-
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quality production workers, while high-quality managers are attracted to firms with better overall
management practices.
The relationships presented in Table II are new and intuitive. They suggest that structured per-
sonnel practices are important for building a stock of high-quality production workers. This makes
sense, as many of the personnel management practices measured by WMS are oriented toward
production workers. As production workers are not in charge of setting the managerial practices
in the firm, causality should run from practices to better production-worker quality. For managers,
both operations and people management practices are similarly correlated with manager quality.
It could be that more structured operations management practices facilitate matches with better
managerial talent, as better managers prefer working in environments where there are well-defined
targets, accountability, and performance evaluation policies in place. On the other hand, it could be
that the causality runs the other way, with higher quality managers implementing more structured
operations practices. Both explanations are likely correct, but determining which channel is most
important is a subject for future research.
4 Conclusion
A firm’s management practices can be viewed as a type of technology that can influence its pro-
ductivity. An important channel of influence is workforce quality. In this paper, we provide the
most complete examination to date of how differences in managerial technology — the struc-
tures and processes in place at the firm — contribute to differences between firms in manager and
production-worker quality.
Key to our analysis is our Brazilian empirical setting, which links administrative information on
firms and their employees with empirically vetted measures of management practices and produc-
tivity data. With our analysis sample, we can uniquely observe the flow components of workforce
construction (hiring, retention and firing), detailed worker employment records (from which we
infer occupation-specific worker quality), a firm’s managerial structure and measures of inputs and
output.
We show that firms with structured management practices — formal processes that transcend
individual managers — consistently hire and retain a larger share of the best managers and produc-
tion workers, and are more discerning when dismissing employees. When we distinguish between
personnel and operations practices, we find that both are roughly equally important for manager
quality, but production-worker quality is related only to personnel practices. This follows from
personnel management practices being specifically designed for evaluating and motivating pro-
duction workers, while the operations practices are primarily concerned with general production
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activities overseen by managers.
While the findings we report are new and important, we concede our inability to make strong
causal claims about the relationship between management practices and the quality of a firm’s
workforce. This problem afflicts most studies that use survey data on management practices, and
ours is no exception. On balance, we believe the evidence is consistent with a model in which
structured personnel practices lead to the selection and retention of high-quality production work-
ers, while high-quality managers are attracted to firms with better overall management practices.
Additionally, our measure of worker quality may not completely reflect the ways in which firms
rank workers for purposes of recruiting. We rely on the fact that worker quality, as we define it,
correlates positively with firm productivity. In doing so, we obtain results that simultaneously val-
idate the our measures of management practices by showing the stated behavior of firm managers
is consistent with the employment decisions observed in the administrative data.
Our analysis opens several important avenues for future work. First, we find that about half
of the relationship between the use of structured management practices and worker quality is ex-
plained by observable characteristics. Do structured management practices commit firms to screen
more effectively on such characteristics, overcoming the sort of managerial biases documented in
Hoffman et al. (2018). In a similar vein, do structured practices help firms develop stronger signals
of worker productivity, thereby limiting statistical discrimination?
Second, there is scope to say more about the role of managers in the adoption of structured man-
agement practices. We have repeated observations on some WMS firms, many of which change
management practices between 2008 and 2013. Using this panel feature of our data, we can ex-
amine how workforce quality varies with those changes. The panel will allow us to track the
transmission of management-practice effects across firms that have employed the same manager.
Finally, we have only shown that management practices affect the average quality of a firm’s
managers and production workers. What role do management practices play in environments
where team production is important? Do structured practices aid in the assembly of the right
combination of complementary skills? Or, are firms with complex production processes requiring
teams of workers with diverse skills more likely to adopt structured practices? Our new dataset
opens the possibility of answering such questions in future work.
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Tables and Figures
Table I: Production function estimates: WMS-RAIS-PIA matched data
Dependent variable: ln(sales) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Management score
z-management 0.213*** 0.168*** 0.088*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.059***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AKM quality measures
z-worker quality 0.247*** 0.076***
(0.039) (0.02)
z-production worker quality 0.031** 0.028* 0.010
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
z-manager quality 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.053***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
z-AKM firm effect 0.098***
(0.02)
Firm characteristics
Share workers with college degree 0.05 0.05
(0.10) (0.10)
Factor inputs Y Y Y Y
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ownership Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Observations 775 775 773 663 663 663
# Firms 679 679 679 594 594 594
R2 0.753 0.796 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
*Standard errors in parentheses. Significance stars omitted.
Notes: Where indicated, the estimated models include factor inputs (the log of capital, raw materials, and the number
of employees), industry dummies, and ownership type (whether the firm is a family-owned). The data are prepared by
merging the PIA industrial survey to the WMS-RAIS matched sample of firms described in Section 2.2.
15
Figure 1: Quality distribution of newly hired managers and production workers
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Figure 2: Quality distribution of managers and production workers in continuing jobs
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Figure 3: Firing rates for managers and production workers by worker quality
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Table II: Management practices and worker quality: Employees of WMS firms in 2003–2013
Panel A: Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
worker in
top quintile
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
Management indicator
Structured practices = 1 0.150 0.482
[0.000] [0.000]
(0.021) (0.057)
Management indices
z-management 0.250 0.107 0.061
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
(0.028) (0.012) (0.012)
z-people 0.030
[0.077]
(0.017)
z-operations 0.037
[0.050]
(0.019)
Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Worker controls Y Y Y
Firm controls Y Y
Observations 239915 239915 239915 239915 239915 239915
R2 0.0356 0.0820 0.0973 0.554 0.559 0.559
# Firms 724 724 724 724 724 724
Panel B: Production workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
worker in
top quintile
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
z-worker
quality
Management indicator
Structured practices = 1 0.105 0.315
[0.000] [0.000]
(0.023) (0.068)
Management indices
z-management 0.185 0.084 0.051
[0.000] [0.000] [0.009]
(0.030) (0.017) (0.020)
z-people 0.055
[0.069]
(0.030)
z-operations 0.002
[0.962]
(0.033)
Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Worker controls Y Y Y
Firm controls Y Y
Observations 897926 897926 897926 897926 897926 897926
R2 0.0169 0.0454 0.0567 0.399 0.403 0.404
# Firms 725 725 725 725 725 725
* p-values in square brackets, standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: Analysis sample includes all employees engaged in WMS firms between 2003–2013. We keep the variable names as “z-worker quality” to
underscore that the measure was estimated using the full sample, and the regressions are simply done on the sub-sample of managers and workers
separately, without re-estimating the values. The dependent variable in Column (1) is an indicator for whether the worker is in the top quintile
of the worker quality distribution. The dependent variable in all other columns is our worker quality measure (estimated AKM person effect, θ)
standardized relative to the worker population. The explanatory variables are standardized measures of either the overall average management score,
or the average using only the people or operations management questions from the WMS. The set of worker controls includes age, number of hours
worked per week, gender, race and education level. The set of firm controls includes multinational status, the share of unionized workers, firm age
and log of firm size (number of employees), and industry effects.
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Appendix for Cornwell, Schmutte, and Scur “Building a productive workforce: the role of
structured management practices,” August 5, 2019
A Data Sources
A.1 The Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS)
We use matched employer-employee data from Brazil’s Relação Anual de Informações Sociais
(RAIS) for the period 2003-2013. The RAIS is an administrative census of all jobs in Brazil
covered by a formal contract. Each year, the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE)
collects data from each establishment on every employment contract that was active during the cal-
endar year. For businesses, reporting the data under RAIS is mandated by the constitution. Hence,
compliance with reporting requirements is extremely high, as employers who fail to complete the
survey face mandatory fines and also risk litigation from employees, to whom the company must
make mandatory leave-loading and social security payments.
For each job, in each year, the employer reports characteristics of the worker, the job, and the
establishment. Worker characteristics include gender, race, age, and educational attainment.23 Job
characteristics relevant to this study include the monthly wage, weekly contracted hours, occupa-
tion, and the cause of job separations (which we use to distinguish voluntary and involuntary sep-
arations.) Establishment characteristics include the establishment’s industry, location, and number
of employees.
A.2 Distinguishing Managers and Production Workers in RAIS
In RAIS, we are able to distinguish managerial and non-managerial workers. Each contract-year
observation includes a variable that reports the 5-digit occupation code according to the Brazilian
classification system, the Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações (CBO).24 Under the CBO, oc-
cupations with the first digit ‘1’ correspond to “Membros superiores do poder público, dirigentes
de organizações de interesse público e de empresas e gerentes” (Leaders of public agencies, and
directors and managers of organizations and businesses). We therefore classify as managerial all
jobs with first digit of CBO code equal to 1.
23Because individual characteristics are reported by the employer, they can change as workers move from job to
job. Cornwell, Rivera and Schmutte (2017) provide evidence that discrepancies in employers’ reports of worker char-
acteristics are associated with other unobserved determinants of earnings, so we leave these variables in as reported.
24Detailed information on the CBO classification system is available via http://www.mtecbo.gov.br.
App. 1
Many of the establishments in RAIS do not have any workers in occupations classified as man-
agerial according to the rule above. However, a third digit of ‘0‘ in the occupation code indicates
the position is supervisory over the jobs in the corresponding two-digit group. For example, oc-
cupations classified with leading digits “52” are “vendors of commerical services.” Occupations
with leading digits “520” are “supervisors of vendors of commercial services.” We classify all such
supervisory occupations as managerial.
A.3 Formal Employment in Brazil
In Brazil, a worker is formally employed if he or she has a registered identification number with
one of two social security programs: the Programa de Integração Social (PIS), or Social Inte-
gration Program, or the Programa de Formação do Patrimônio do Servidor Público (PASEP), or
Civil Servants Equity Formation Program, depending on whether the worker is employed in the
private sector or the public sector. PIS/PASEP numbers are consistent across workers and follow
a worker for life. For firms, formal employment means that the employer contributes the Abono
Salarial along with other social security payments to a bank account administered by either Caixa
Econômica Federal if registered with PIS, or Banco do Brasil for PASEP workers. Formal em-
ployers must also have employment contracts for all employees. The most common contract type
is the Consolidação das Leis de Trabalho (CLT), or Labor Law Consolidation. Other formal em-
ployment relationships include internships, independent contracting, directorships and government
contracts, but we do not consider these contract types in this paper. The number of formal con-
tracts grew steadily in Brazil during our sample period, from nearly 42 million jobs in 2003 to over
72 million jobs in 2010. Unemployment decreased from eleven percent to five percent, and real
wages grew over the period as well. Our sample therefore covers a period of growth and tightening
labor-market conditions.
A.4 Preparation of the RAIS Data for Estimating the AKMModel
We base our analysis on an extract of the full RAIS data with several restrictions. For workers with
multiple jobs in a given year, we focus on the job with the highest total earnings in that year, based
on the reported number of months worked and the average monthly earnings. We also restrict
attention to jobs with at least 30 hours contracted hours per week. Using this unbalanced panel of
workers, we drop all observations in plants with fewer than five workers, and observations with
missing data on tenure or earnings. Finally, we drop all observations where the job is reported to
be some form of government contract.
App. 2
B Appendix Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Summary statistics for matched WMS-RAIS firms
Mean Median Min Max SD N
Firm characteristics
Number of employees (WMS) 600.78 300.0 40.0 5000.0 (816.49) 961
Number of production sites, total (WMS) 3.79 1.0 0.0 91.0 (9.40) 961
Number of production sites, abroad (WMS) 2.28 0.0 0.0 100.0 (11.05) 961
Firm age (WMS) 36.42 33.0 1.0 316.0 (25.55) 961
Firm has no competitors (WMS) 0.01 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.08) 961
Firm has less than 5 competitors (WMS) 0.23 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.42) 961
Firm has 5 or more competitors (WMS) 0.76 1.0 0.0 1.0 (0.43) 961
Firm is family owned (WMS) 0.26 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.44) 961
Firm is founder owned (WMS) 0.36 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.48) 961
Firm is institutionally owned (WMS) 0.05 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.22) 961
Firm is non-family privately owned (WMS) 0.16 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.36) 961
Firm is owned by dispersed shareholders (WMS) 0.14 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.34) 961
Other ownership (WMS) 0.04 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.19) 961
Firm is a multinational (WMS) 0.21 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.41) 961
Firm is a domestic multinational (WMS) 0.01 0.0 0.0 1.0 (0.11) 961
Hierarchy: layers between CEO and shopfloor (WMS) 3.33 3.0 1.0 8.0 (1.15) 961
Span of control: number of direct reports (WMS) 7.09 6.0 1.0 30.0 (5.01) 961
Management scores
Overall management score, raw (WMS) 2.70 2.7 1.1 4.7 (0.65) 961
Operations management score, raw (WMS) 2.44 2.5 1.0 5.0 (1.02) 961
People management score, raw (WMS) 2.52 2.5 1.0 4.7 (0.58) 961
Worker characteristics
Share of female managers (WMS) 0.18 0.1 0.0 1.0 (0.19) 480
Share of female non-managers (WMS) 0.30 0.3 0.0 1.0 (0.24) 480
Share of female workers, total (WMS) 0.30 0.3 0.0 1.0 (0.24) 480
Share of female workers, total (RAIS) 0.29 0.2 0.0 1.0 (0.22) 961
Age of workers (RAIS) 33.05 32.7 21.0 53.0 (3.75) 961
Weekly hours worked (RAIS) 43.51 44.0 30.0 44.0 (1.29) 961
Weekly hours worked (WMS) 43.80 44.0 35.0 65.0 (2.47) 961
Weekly hours worked, managers (WMS) 48.68 45.0 35.0 80.0 (7.06) 961
Weekly hours worked, non-managers (WMS) 43.63 44.0 35.0 65.0 (2.45) 961
Employee tenure, weeks (RAIS) 43.98 39.8 2.9 213.7 (22.12) 961
Hourly wage, BRL Reais (RAIS) 11.24 8.3 2.5 159.7 (10.61) 961
Monthly earnings, BRL Reais (RAIS) 2079.36 1530.3 463.4 30120.6 (1931.22) 961
Worker education
Share of managers with university degree (WMS) 0.73 0.9 0.0 1.0 (0.33) 961
Share of non-managers with university degree (WMS) 0.10 0.1 0.0 1.0 (0.13) 961
Share of employees with university degree (WMS) 0.13 0.1 0.0 1.0 (0.13) 961
Share of employees with university degree (RAIS) 0.13 0.1 0.0 1.0 (0.18) 961
Share of employees with high school degree (RAIS) 0.55 0.6 0.0 1.0 (0.21) 961
Notes: The sample is a firm-year panel with one observation for each WMS firm in each year it was surveyed and
can be matched to RAIS. There are 694 unique firms. Of these, 267 were surveyed in both years, 213 were surveyed
only in 2008, and 214 were surveyed only in 2013. Note that the WMS only asked Brazilian firms about gender
composition in 2013, which explains the discrepancies in the number of observations for those variables.
App. 3
Table B.2: AKM decomposition of variance in log wages: RAIS 2003–2013
Variance Share
Component of Total
Total Variance of Log Wage 0.472 100.0
Variance Component:
V ar(Worker Effect θ) 0.235 49.8%
V ar(Establishment Effect ψ) 0.088 18.5%
V ar(Xβ) 0.046 9.7%
V ar(Residual) 0.044 9.2%
2× Cov(θ, ψ) 0.095 20.2%
2× Cov(Xβ, θ) −0.034 −7.3%
2× Cov(Xβ,ψ) −.001 −.00%
Notes: Share of variance in log wages explained by components estimated from the AKMmodel described in Equation
(1).
Table B.3: Correlation among log wage components from AKM model: RAIS 2003–2013
Component Correlations
Component Label Mean Std. Dev. Y Xβˆ θˆ ψˆ εˆ
Y Log wage 1.649 0.687 1.000
Xβˆ Time varying characteristics† 0.137 0.215 0.192 1.000
θˆ Worker effect 0.000 0.485 0.797 −.166 1.000
ψˆ Firm effect 0.000 0.296 0.663 −.009 0.332 1.000
εˆ Sample residual 0.000 0.209 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Notes: Observation-weighted correlations among the variance components of log wages estimated from the AKM
model described in Equation (1)
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Figure B.1: Employment shares in structured and unstructured firms
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